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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal proceeding pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, § 78A-4-l 03(2) G).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES

The issue of Daniel Maynard and Maynard Cronin Erickson Curran & Sparks,
PLC, being granted summary judgment by the trial court, and the arguments upon which
the judgment is based were preserved, by the motion, and by the supporting and reply
memoranda. Rec. 2911-14, 2923-3182, 3578-3606.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this action, Kara Cattani, as Trustee of the Oates Family Trust (the "Trust"),
initially asserted six different claims against Daniel Maynard ("Maynard"), an attorney,
and his law firm Maynard Cronin Erickson Curran & Sparks, PLC (the "Law
Firm"),including: In the First Cause of Action, "Professional Negligence;" in the
Second Cause of Action, "Breach of Contract;" in the Third Cause of Action,
"Constructive Trust;" in the Fourth Cause of Action, "Unjust Enrichment;" in the Fifth
Cause of Action, "Breach of Fiduciary Duty;" and, in the Sixth Cause of Action (which is
mistakenly referred to in the Complaint as the "Fifth"), "Aiding and Abetting a Breach of
Fiduciary Duty." R. 492-512. Maynard and the Law Firm filed a motion for summary
judgment R. 2911-14, which was granted dismissing all of the claims against them. R.
3626-38.
In this appeal, the Trust is now only arguing that Maynard and the Law Firm aided
and abetted the fonner trustee of the Trust, Diane Nolen ("Nolen"), in breaching her
fiduciary duties owed to the Trust, and was unjustly enriched by the fees Nolen paid from
the Trust to Maynard and the Law Firm for legal services he provided defending her
against the claims of certain Trust's beneficiaries. See Appellant Brief ("App. Brief') at
42.1

1

The claims that the Trust has abandoned in this appeal were based upon the alleged
existence of an attorney-client relationship between Maynard and the Trust. Since the
Trust is no longer arguing that such a relationship existed between Maynard and the Trust
(App. Brief at 5), those abandoned claims have no basis. R. 293 8-2940.
2
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COURSE OF PROCEEDING AND LOWER COURT DISPOSITION
The Trust commenced this action on January 15, 2010. R. 1-22. Maynard and the
Law Firm filed a motion for summary judgment on February 3, 2015, on all claims
asserted against them in the action. R. 2911-14. The motion was granted by the
Decision of the trial court dismissing all of the claims on June 12, 2015. R. 3626-38.

(riP
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about August 4, 1971, Ernest Oates ("Ernest") and Florence Marsh Oates
("Florence") executed a document entitled "Declaration of Trust Oates Family Trust"
(the "Trust Agreement"), which created the Trust. R. 2956-64. After the death of Ernest
in 1996, Diane Nolen ("Nolen") served as a co-trustee with Florence, and then became
the sole trustee when Florence died on December 10, 2005. R. 495 at ,Il 8, 496 at 26, 497
at ,r 39.
In or about the first part of 2006 and continuing thereafter, the heirs of Florence
Irene Cattani (the "Cattanis"), beneficiaries of the Trust, started making demands on
Nolen regarding (i) the alleged impropriety of her acting as the Trustee and as personal
representative of the estate, (ii) her alleged ownership of an interest in the Oxford/Santa
Fe Ltd., Colorado limited partnership (the "Partnership") and use of Trust funds, which
the Cattanis claimed were part of Ernest's estate or the Trust, and (iii) their demand for
accounting, among other things. See e.g. R. 2995, 3000, 3009, 3031-32, 3040-4 7, 3007,
3074,3076,3084,3100-04.
After Nolen received correspondence from the Cattanis questioning her actions as
trustee, she decided to obtain independent personal legal counsel to represent her against
the claims of the Cattanis. R. 3059 ,r~ 18, 19, 73:2-75:5, 82:10-85:4, 2984-85. Nolen
considered Maynard to be her personal attorney only, as opposed to the attorney for the
Trust. R. 3959.
From the initial consultation with Nolen, Maynard understood that defendant Lyle
Drake ("Drake") was the attorney for the Trust. R. 3071. Likewise, Drake understood
4
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that Maynard was not representing Nolen in matters relating to the Trust administration,
but rather was representing her personally. R. 3004-05, 3021-22. Maynard continued
representing Nolen personally against the Cattanis' claims, while Drake continued
representing Nolen in her capacity as Trustee. R. 2064-67, 3078-79, 3081, 3085-86,
i.41

3088-89; see also 2979, 2981-82. Nolen never engaged Maynard to perform services on
behalf of the Trust. R. 2988.
The initial scope of Maynard's representation of Nolen was to determine what
issues the Cattanis had with Nolen acting as trustee and their threats against her,
including threats to sue her. R. 2993, 3070. Maynard's primary focus initially was on
the issue of ownership of the Partnership interest. R. 2936 ,I 26, 3073.
Maynard did not advise Nolan on her duty, as trustee, to provide an accounting,
which was handled by Drake as the attorney for the Trust. R. 2988, 3009-3016, 3082-83,
3090, 3095-96. Drake has no recollection of even speaking with Maynard regarding the
accounting. R. 3012.
After the Nolen Litigation commenced, Maynard did advise Nolan to resign as
trustee because of the stress she was experiencing. R. 3098-99. However, Nolen wanted
~

to remain trustee because it was her mother's request. R. 2986. Maynard did not become
aware that Nolen had paid his legal fees from the Trust account until after the Nolen
Litigation. R. 3093-94.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Trust is asserting two separate claims against Maynard and the Law Firm.
First, that Maynard, as counsel for Nolen, aided and abetted her in breaching her
5
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fiduciary duty owed to the Trust. Second, that Maynard was unjustly enriched because
Nolen paid Maynard for his legal services with funds of the Trust. Both these claims fail.
The aiding and abetting claims fail because attorneys enjoy an immunity from
claims of third parties, including claims of aiding and abetting, as long as the attorney
acts in behalf of the client within the scope of the representation and are not acting for
their own self-interest or in a dishonest or unlawful fashion. Since Maynard was acting
within the scope of his representation of Nolen, the claim of aiding and abetting fails.
Alternatively, Maynard is not liable for aiding and abetting because he did not
"knowingly participate" in any alleged breach by Nolen of her fiduciary duties.
Additionally, the Trust is unable to prove that Maynard was the cause of any harm
sustained by the Trust.
Maynard is not liable for unjust enrichment for various reasons. First, Nolen was
statutorily entitled to reimbursement from Trust for the fees she paid to Maynard.
Second, by settling with Nolen for the repayment of the fees paid to Maynard, the Trust
fully resolved its claims concerning the payment of Nolan's legal fees and thereby
waived its claim against Maynard relating to those payments. In this regard, if the Trust
is entitled to recover the fees from both Maynard and Nolen, it will have been unjustly
enriched since it would have a double recovery. Finally, Maynard and the Law Firm
were not unjustly enriched, as they were entitled to payments for the legal services they
rendered.

6
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING THE CLAIM OF AIDING AND ABETTING AGAINST
MAYNARD.
The Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Maynard dismissing
the claims of the Trust against him on two separate but related grounds. First, Maynard is
immune from the claim of aiding and abetting because the Trust failed to proffer
evidence that Maynard acted outside the scope of his representation of Nolen or acted for
his own personal benefit. Second, the Trust failed to proffer evidence that Maynard

"knowingly participated" in the alleged breach of fiduciary duty, which is a necessary
element of a claim of aiding and abetting. The evidence presented to the trial court did
not show that Maynard acted outside the scope of his engagement or that he knowingly
participated in any alleged breach of fiduciary duty. R. 2935-2937.

A.

The Acts of Maynard Which the Trust Claims Supports a Finding of
Aiding and Abetting Were all Within the Scope of Maynard's
Representation of Nolen, and, Therefore, Maynard is Immune from the
Trust's Claim.

Utah has not yet considered the common rule of protecting attorneys from claims
of third parties while acting within the scope of representing a client. This rule, which
has been adopted in varies forms in many other States, should be adopted in Utah and
applied in this case. Generally stated: "An attorney who acts within the scope of the
~

attorney-client relationship will not be liable to third persons for actions arising out of his
professional relationship unless the attorney exceeds the scope of his employment or acts

vu

for personal gain." Maness v. Star-Kist Foods, 1 F.3d 704, 709 (8th Cir. 1993).
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Although the concept is the same, some courts have restated the rule differently.

See e.g. Meier v. Pearlman, 401 N.E.2d 31, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) ("Absent fraud,
collusion, malicious or tortious conduct on the part of an attorney, the rule is equally well
established that no liability to third parties arises from the attorney's conduct as an
attorney for another."); Macke Laundry Serv. Ltd. Pshp. v. Jetz Serv. Co., 931 S.W.2d

~

166, 182 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("This court recognizes a privilege for attorneys ... so long
as the attorney does not employ wrongful means and acts with good faith to protect the

iJ

interests of the client and not for the attorney's self-interest."); Gardner v. Manco, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39730, 24-25 (D. Minn. 2005) ("An attorney acting within the scope of
<iw

his employment as attorney is immune from liability to third persons for actions arising
out of that professional relationship. This immunity, to be sure, may not be invoked if the
attorney, exceeding the bounds of this unique agency relationship, either is dominated by

~

his own personal interest or knowingly participates with his client in the perpetration of a
fraudulent or unlawful act.").
This rule of attorney immunity has been applied to bar claims against an attorney
for aiding and abetting a client who is breaching a fiduciary duty. In Reynolds v.

Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1068 (Or. 2006), considering a claim of aiding and abetting by
an attorney, the court first noted that it had "not considered previously what privileges, if
any, protect a person from liability for substantially assisting another in a breach of
fiduciary duty." Id. at 1067 The court then reviewed cases that had considered privileges
as they relate to claims for interference with contractual relations brought against
advisors or agents who acted on behalf of another person or entity. Id. at 1067-68. The
8
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~

court concluded from those cases that "the effective performance of the duties arising
from those relationships required that the person performing those duties have a qualified
privilege from tort liability. Id. at 1068. The court applied the same qualified privilege
to attorneys and stated:
Not every relationship between a person who breaches a contract or a
fiduciary duty and one who substantially assists in such a breach
necessarily justifies recognition of a privilege against liability. However,
we think that the lawyer-client relationship is one that does. That is true, in
our view, because safeguarding the lawyer-client relationship protects more
than just an individual or entity in any particular case or transaction; it is
integral to the protection of the legal system itself. ...

~

Id.; see also Alpert v. Riley, 2008 WL 304 742, at* 18 (S.D. Tex. 2008) ("The plaintiffs'
state-law claims for aiding and abetting Riley in breaching his fiduciary duties to the
plaintiffs ... are barred. The alleged actions by the Lawyer Defendants occurred in the
course of their legal representation of Riley. The plaintiffs have not met the requirements
to plead that the Lawyer Defendants' alleged acts were fraudulent."). 2
To overcome the qualified privilege or immunity afforded attorneys acting within
the scope of their engagement, the Trust must establish that Maynard acted essentially for
his own benefit and to Nolen' s detriment, or was otherwise acting fraudulently or
unlawfully. Since the evidence presented below does not show that Maynard was acting

\iJP

2

See also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 57(3) (2000):

A lawyer who advises or assists a client to make or break a contract, to
enter or dissolve a legal relationship, or to enter or not enter a contractual
relation, is not liable to a nonclient for interference with contract or with
prospective contractual relations or with a legal relationship, if the lawyer
acts to advance the client's objectives without using wrongful means.
9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

outside the scope of his representation of Nolen or acting for his own self-interest,
Maynard should be granted immunity from the claim of aiding and abetting. 3

IJ

Accordingly, the decision of the lower court on this issue should be upheld.

B.

The Claim of Aiding and Abetting Fails Because the Trust Hs Not
Offered Evidence that Maynard Knowingly Participated or Provided
Substantial Assistance to Nolen Concerning the Alleged Breach of
Fiduciary Duty.

The Trust claims Maynard assisted Nolen in breaching the following duties: (i)
misappropriation by Nolen of Trust funds; 4 (ii) Nolen's refusal to provide an accounting; 5
(iii) Nolen's payment of Maynard's fees with funds of the Trust; 6 and, (iv) Nolen's
<iv
3

A related theory to the immunity discussed in text, the litigation privilege also protects
attorneys from clams of third parties. See Taylor v. McNichols, 243 P.3d 642, 655 (Idaho
2010) ("We hold that the litigation privilege applies in Idaho, and bars a litigant from
bringing claims against the attorneys of his adversary in that litigation, where the claims
are grounded in the attorneys' conduct or communications made in the course of
representing their clients in that litigation, and the attorneys are acting within the scope of
that representation and not solely for their own benefit.").
4

The Trust seems to acknowledge in its Brief, as stated above, that Maynard had no
knowledge of the alleged misappropriation of Trust funds until after the lawsuit against
Nolen. App. Brief at 45. Accordingly, he could not have "aided and abetted" her in this
regard.
5

As noted above, Maynard did not advise Nolen regarding the accounting issue. Drake
handled that issue. Maynard represented her personally against the claims of the
Cattanis. If Maynard did advise Nolan on accounting issues, it was after the Nolen
Litigation had been initiated against Nolan, and, of course, Maynard was clearly
representing Nolan individually. Accordingly, Maynard could not have aided and abetted
Nolen in this regard. R. 2988, 3009-3016, 3082-83, 3090, 3095-96.
6

Drake advised Nolen that it was proper to use Trust assets to pay for the legal fees she
incurred to defend herself from the claims of the Cattanis. R. 2987, 3023-24, 3029-30.
Maynard did not advise Nolen on the propriety of payment of his fees from the Trust
assets. R. 3072-73. Accordingly, he did not "aid and abet" Nolen regarding payment of
fees.
10
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continuation as trustee of the Trust notwithstanding the alleged conflict of interest. 7
However, the Trust failed to cite any evidence showing that Maynard did anything or
participated in the alleged breaches other than by simply representing Nolen against the
claims of the Cattanis. Nowhere do the beneficiaries offer evidence or even argue that
~

Maynard provide "substantial assistance" or "knowing participation," as required for a
claim of "aiding and abetting." The Trust only argues the "knowing" element and fails to
address the issue of "participation." App. Brief 45-46.
There is no question that Utah does recognize the tort of aiding and abetting (by
~

non-attorneys) a breach of fiduciary, and that the "gravamen of the claim of aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is the defendant's knowing participation in the
fiduciary's breach." See Mower v. Simpson, 2012 UT App. 149138, 278 P.3d 1076
(emphasis added); see also App. Brief at 45. Maynard has not, and does not, argue to the
contrary. However, a claim of aiding and abetting requires proof of both knowledge and
actual participation. See Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585, 594 (D. Haw. 1985)
("Secondary liability may also be predicated on an aiding and abetting theory. This would
require that a defendant both possess actual knowledge of the fraud and render substantial
assistance in furthering it."); Piscitello v. Giannetti, 2016 WL 1559156, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.)
("Plaintiff has not alleged that TD Bank knew about any fraud or 'provided substantial

vJiJ

7

As noted in the preceding three footnotes Maynard did not advise Nolen regarding the
alleged breach. He was only representing her against the claims of the Cattanis.
Accordingly, he was not aiding her for purposes of a claim of aiding and abetting.
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assistance to advance the fraud's commission,' both of which are required to avoid
dismissal of an aiding and abetting claim."); Holmes v. Young, 885 P .2d 305, 308-09
(Colo. App. 1994) ("Liability for aiding or abetting a tortious act will be found if the
party whom the defendant aids performs a wrongful act that causes an injury, the
defendant is generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at
the time that he provides the assistance, and the defendant knowingly and substantially
assists the principal violation."). 8
Even assuming Maynard had knowledge of the alleged wrongful actions of Nolen,
which is not supported by the evidence, 9 participation in the underlying tort must be
"substantial." See Go-Best Assets Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 972 N.E.2d 426,438
(Mass. 2012) ("To prove that the bank aided and abetted a tort, the plaintiff must show:
(1) that Goldings committed the relevant tort; (2) that the bank knew he was committing
the tort; and (3) that the bank actively participated in or substantially assisted in his
commission of the tort.").
The Utah courts have not expounded on the definition of"knowing participation,"
but clearly the majority rule requires "active participation" and/or "substantial
assistance." The rule stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 876 (1979) requires

8

Some courts note that knowing participation must also amount to "substantial
assistance" with the breach of fiduciary duty. See e.g. Nelson v. Elway, 971 P.2d 245,
249-50 (Colo. App. 1998) (After first reciting the substance of the elements for aiding
and abetting, the court stated: "Also, Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 876(b) (1977),
upon which the tort is premised, includes as an additional element that a defendant must
give substantial assistance to the other's breach.").
9

See footnotes 4-6, supra.
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that the person aiding and abetting also provide substantial assistance. The Restatement
states:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common
design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself,
or

~

(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious
result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of
duty to the third person.
See El Camino Resources, LTD. v. Huntington Nat. Bank, 722 F. Supp. 2d 875 (W.D.

Mich. 2010) ajf'd, 712 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2013) ("In addition to requiring actual
knowledge of another's breach of duty, the Restatement requires that the putative aider
and abettor give "substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself."). This element is not even asserted, much less supported by evidence, in the
Trust's claim against Maynard. The Trust only argues that Maynard had knowledge of
the alleged breach. App. Brief at 45-46. 10
~

10

\JP

The Trust argues that Maynard was aware that a significant amount of money had gone
through the Trust and, therefore, he must have reviewed the Trust's checking accounting
records and knew that Nolen had written checks to herself. App. Brief 56. By this
argument, the Trust is asking the Court to infer that Maynard had knowledge of an
impropriety even though the inference cannot be supported by direct testimony. This
argue is nothing short of speculation. See Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 148 N.M. 713,
721 (N.M. 2010) ("An inference is not a supposition or a conjecture, but is a logical
deduction from facts proved and guess work is not a substitute therefor .... ").
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When a claim of aiding and abetting is asserted against an attorney, as in this case,
the claimant must show that the attorney did more than merely provide legal
representation, but must show the attorney was acting outside the scope of the
engagement or was actively and substantially involved in the breach of fiduciary duties.

In this case, whether based upon immunity or because the element of substantial
assistance or knowing participation is not satisfied, the evidence presented below was
insufficient to sustain the Trust's claims. Therefore, the grant of summary judgment in

iJ

favor of Maynard and the Law Firm should be upheld. 11
C.

The Trust Is Unable To Prove the Causation Element Required For a
Claim Against Maynard.

To provide a claim of aiding and abetting, causation is obviously a necessary
element. If the plaintiff sustained no harm as a result of the defendant's actions, there is
no claim. Mosier v. Stonefield Josephson, Inc., 815 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016) ("No
matter which avenue Mosier pursues, his professional negligence as well as his aiding
and abetting claims require Mosier to prove that Stonefield's tortious conduct was a
proximate cause of PEM Group's harm.").

11

The Trust cites three California cases attempting to refute the rule that attorneys have a
certain amount of protection from third party claims while acting within the scope of the
representation. These cases are of no assistance to the Trust. The case of Wolf v.
Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 792 (1999), which the Trust did not
accurately quoted regarding the scope of improprieties by the attorney, was citing to the
case of Pierce v. Lymann, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1093 (1991), which is another case cited by the
Trust. The Pierce court actually noted: "The rendering of legal advice of the trustee was
insufficient; the attorney must have actively colluded with the trustee in breaching the
trustee's fiduciary duties." Id. at 241.
14
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~

~

In this instance, the claim of the Trust is that Maynard failed to properly advise
Nolen to resign as trustee, to provide an accounting, and to return property she had
allegedly improperly appropriated for her personal use. However, there is absolutely no
evidence that Nolen, if she had been given that advice, would have acknowledged her
alleged wrongdoing and followed the advice of Maynard.
To prove causation based upon faulty advice, it must be shown that the client
relied on the advice. See Carlson v. Norwest Bank Minn., 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 893,
13 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (stating an element of a legal malpractice action based upon
faulty advice, "The negligent giving of advice or exercise of judgment on which the
client detrimentally relies."); In re Hallwood Energy, L.P., 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5691, 30
(Bank.r. N.D. Tex. 2013) ("Without alleging some factual basis for the Plaintift's theory
that HELP would have followed advice to seek, find, and close an actual transaction ... ,
the First Amended Complaint provides no facts that, taken as true, show that any act of
the Defendants proximately caused HELP to suffer the claim .... "). Here, there can be no
claim against Maynard or the Law Firm where the string of causation is broken by Nolen,
who did not rely on any faulty advice from Maynard. Accordingly, the aiding and

0D

abetting claims against Maynard and the Law Firm fail.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING THE CLAIM OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT.

The Trust's unjust enrichment claim must also fail. First, Nolen was entitled as a
matter of law to reimbursement from Trust for the fees she paid to Maynard. Second, by
~

settling with Nolen for the repayment of the fees paid to Maynard, the Trust fully
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~

resolved its claims concerning the payment of Nolan's legal fees and waived its claim
against Maynard relating to those payments. Finally, Maynard and the Law Firm were
not unjustly enriched, as they were entitled to payments for the legal services they
rendered.
~

A. Nolen Was Entitled to Have the Trust Pay Her Fees Charged by Maynard.
Nolan's payment of the fees charged by Maynard from the Trust is authorized by
statute. Section 75-7-1004(2) of the Utah Code states:

If a trustee defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether
successful or not, the trustee is entitled to receive from the trust the
necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's
fees, incurred.
In In re George Fisher Jr. Vivas Trust, 2009 UT App 305,221 P.3d 845, the court
addressed an issue similar to this matter, i.e. a trustee was seeking reimbursement from
the trust for defending itself against claims of beneficiaries. There was one significant
distinction between that case and this case. In Fisher, the beneficiaries of the trust sued
the trustee for conversion of trust assets and actually prevailed. The trustee then sought
reimbursement of his attorney's fees under Section 75-7-1004(2). The trial court refused,
although it determined that the trustee's defense was in good faith. In the lead opinion,

€tu

but the minority opinion of recovery of fees, the Judge stated:
I believe that the statute not only makes sense, but means exactly what it
says--it is applicable to any proceeding defended in good faith. My
colleagues are apparently of the opinion that an exception is required when
the proceeding involves self-dealing by the trustee. . . . Yet there is
absolutely no statutory language, case law, or legislative history that would
indicate such an interpretation. Thus, Respondent is entitled to receive
reimbursement from the trust for the reasonable attorney fees incurred in

16
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~

his defense. I would therefore remand this issue to the trial court to award
Respondent reimbursement of his reasonable attorney fees.
Id. at 121. The dissenting opinion, which was the majority on the issue of recovery of

fees, concluded that the trustee's attorney's fees were not recoverable because the trustee
was found to have actually acted in self-interest. The Court stated~ however:
I agree that section 75-7-1004(2) allows a trustee to recover reasonable
attorney fees from the trust when defending against any proceeding in good
faith, whether or not the defense is successful. ...
Fisher, 2009 UT App 305, ,I 31 (J. Thome, dissenting).

In this instance, the claim of the beneficiaries in the prior litigation was settled
and, among other things, Nolan actually retained the Partnership interest which was one
of the issues in the litigation. As a result, there was no actual finding that Nolan was
engaged in self-dealing. Even the dissent in the Fisher case acknowledged that a Trustee
can recover fees even if they do not prevail. Accordingly, it was appropriate for Nolan to
pay those fees actually paid, which was less than the full amount charged. See also
Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Messera, 4 F. Supp. 2d 293,299

(S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The Funds' payment of trustee counsel fees in no way violates the rule
that fund assets be used for fund purposes. Indeed, the practice likely benefits the Funds,
as Tunick contends, if only because qualified trustees would not perform work for the
Funds in the absence of independent counsel to advise them."). Because Nolen had the
right to reimbursement for fees, the decision of the lower court should be sustained.
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B. The Trust Waived Any Claim Against Maynard Regarding the Fees by
Settling with Nolen and Recovering the Fees from Her.

In this case, it is Nolan, based upon the advice of Drake, who paid the fees to
Maynard. Maynard was owed the fees by Nolen regardless of whether she was entitled to
reimbursement from the Trust. If a claim exists to recover fees, the claim must be against
Nolan, who is primarily liable. However, as part of the settlement in prior litigation
against Nolen, the new Trustee waived "any and all claims that it has or has asserted or
may have against Ms. Nolen." This clearly covered any claim for the fees paid to

~

Maynard since the Settlement specifically referred to the fees. See Settlement ~ 4: "As
part of the settlement, the parties acknowledged that the Trustee has also asserted a claim

~

against Ms. Nolen to repay to the Trust certain legal fees that were paid by Ms. Nolen
while she was the Trustee." R. 3134. The release of Nolen, who was primarily liable,
waives or satisfies any claims against Maynard.
At common law, the release of the party primarily liable on a claim also released
and waived any claims against parties that were secondarily liable. See Rodriquez v. SCG
Mortg. Corp., 865 A.2d 987, 990 (Pa. Cornrow. Ct. 2005) ("[W]here there is a primarily

responsible tortfeasor and a secondarily liable tortfeasor, release of the primary tortfeasor
also acts as a release of the secondary tortfeasor."); Divine Tower Jnt'l Corp. v. Kegler,
Brown, Hill & Ritter Co., L.P.A., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65078, 23 (S.D. Ohio 2007)

("By operation of law, the liability of the secondary party is necessarily extinguished
when the primary party is released."). In Utah, the release of parties jointly liable is
controlled by statute. Section 15-4-5 of the Utah Code provides:
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If an obligee releasing or discharging an obligor without express
reservation of rights against a co-obligor then knows or has reason to know
that the obligor released or discharged did not pay as much of the claim as
he was bound by his contract or relation with that co-obligor to pay, the
obligee's claim against that co-obligor shall be satisfied to the amount
which the obligee knew or had reason to know that the released or
discharged obligor was bound to such co-obligor to pay. 12

In this instance, the Trust knew that Nolen owed the fees to Maynard and the
Trust's release ofNolen with respect to the payment of fees necessarily, as a matter of
~

law, released Maynard. Elsewise, if the Trust is permitted to pursue its claims against
these Defendants for the payment of their fees, Maynard and the Law firm would be left
without compensation for the legal services they have rendered and the Trust will have
received a double recovery. 13

12

The Trust argues that the Trust did not knowing relinquish a known right as if this
was a traditional common law waiver. The waiver in fact occurred as a matter of law by
releasing Nolan on the claim and being paid by Nolen for the allegedly improperly paid
fees. The Trusts seems to be seeking a double recovery.
13

The Trust argues that Section 15-4-5 does not apply because Nolen and Maynard are
not co-obligors. Clearly they are. They are allegedly jointly liable, according to the
Trust, for the same exact debt. Additionally, Section 15-4-3 requires the Trust to credit
the amount paid by Nolen in the as part of her settlement. Because of the application of
the statute, the Trusts waiver argument fails. Additionally, contrary to the argument of
the Trust, Section 78B-5-822 does not apply because Maynard is not a joint tort-feasor
with Nolen. See Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1986) ("A primary
purpose of the Uniform Act was to change the common law rule so that release of one
joint tort-feasor did not automatically release all tort-feasors."). A claim of unjust
enrichment is not a tort, so the section does not apply. See Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 330
P.3d 762, 766 (Utah App. 2014) ("A cause of action for unjust enrichment is generally
equivalent to a contract-implied-in-law claim").
19
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C. The Trust Cannot Satisfy The Elements Of Unjust Enrichment.
To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, the Trust must establish (1) "a benefit

Gv

conferred on one person by another," (2) "the conferee ... appreciate[d] or ha[d]
knowledge of the benefit," and (3) "'the accepta~ce or retention by the conferee of the
benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the
benefit without payment of its value."' Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT
83, 12 P.3d 580 (quoting Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1994)). In this case,

CibJ

the Trust alleges it conferred a benefit on Maynard and the Law Firm because Nolan paid
them for the legal services they rendered, using Trust assets she thought she was entitled
/(,,,

..

~

to use. The Trust, however, cannot satisfy the third element of unjust enrichment.
Maynard has not been "enriched." There is no dispute that Maynard perfonned
the legal services, and was thus entitled to receive the payments. Maynard was merely
made whole by the payment of his fees; he was not unjustly enriched. See In re Bayou
Hedge Funds Inv. Litig., 472 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that a claim

for unjust enrichment against a defendant could not survive, even if the defendant was
paid "using misappropriated funds," because the defendant was paid for work it actually
performed). There is no circumstance in which it would be inequitable for Maynard to
retain the payments earned. Indeed, it would be inequitable for Maynard to disgorge
those payments, because he then would have performed legal services for which he
would have received no compensation. Additionally, the Trust will have recovered the
fees twice: Once from Nolen in the prior settlement and again from Maynard.
Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment should be upheld.
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GL.,

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the dismissal of the claims against Maynard and the
Law Firm should be upheld in this appeal. 14

Respectfully submitted this 27th day of April, 2016.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
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Alex B. Leeman

Attorneys for Appellees Daniel Maynard, and
Maynard Cronin Erickson Curran & Sparks, P.L. C.

~
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Maynard and the Law Firm adopt by this reference the arguments of Lyle Drake and
Durham, Jones & Pinegar regarding issue preclusion.
14
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